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Overview: Four Dichotomies in
American Trade Policy
PROFESSOR HAROLD HONGJU KOH: Let me begin by thank-
ing the entire staff of the Yale Law & Policy Review for everything it
has done to make this conference possible. It bears repeating that
this conference has been entirely conceived, planned, organized,
and now executed by Yale law students, with only minimal assist-
ance from the faculty and administration.
If you have been watching the Bork confirmation hearings and
counting the number of present and former Yale law professors who
have been testifying for and against Judge Bork (including Judge
Bork himself), you are well aware that the New Haven-to-Washing-
ton axis remains alive and well. At a minimum, the Yale Law & Policy
Review must be congratulated today for having single-handedly
equalized the traffic flow in the opposite direction. The Review's ef-
forts-and particularly the hard work of Editor-in-Chief Rhonda
Brown and the Trade Symposium team-have cast off "positive ex-
ternalities" (as we like to say around here) on many in our commu-
nity. (I understand, for example, that Business Express' 3:30 flight
to Washington, D.C. this afternoon will be filled entirely with con-
ference participants, and that Pepe's Apizza was nearly over-
whelmed last night by hungry panelists.) But most of all, the
Review's efforts have redounded to the benefit of all of us here in the
Law School, University, and New Haven communities who are inter-
ested in the present and future of American trade policy.
The Review's editors have asked me to provide a brief overview of
today's conference and how today's four panels relate to one an-
other. Whether your perspective is principally academic, or that of
an insider integrally involved in the trade policymaking process (as
so many of our panelists are), or that of an interested lay person
trying to understand recent trade developments, most of you proba-
bly need no convincing that this conference arrives at a moment of
extraordinary ferment in American trade policy.
Any skeptics among you need look no further than the "Gephardt
for President" commercials that have been appearing on the eve-
ning news-or further even than the Toshiba television sets on
which you may have been watching those commercials-to recog-
nize that trade questions have recently moved from the back-burner
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to the very forefront of our national political debate. In just the last
few months, we have watched as the U.S. monthly merchandise
trade deficit hit a record $16.5 billion in July 1987 (with imports
measured on a cost-insurance-freight basis). We have watched the
dollar fall below 140 yen and the Group of Seven countries pour
some $70 billion into the international currency markets to support
the dollar at its current levels.' We have followed the dramatic
heightening of trade tensions between the United States and Japan
that followed America's imposition upon Japan of semiconductor
tariffs this summer. These tensions have grown so severe that they
have now begun to manifest themselves in curious ways, for exam-
ple, by the ceremonial bashing of a Toshiba radio on the Capitol
lawn and by Eastman Kodak's request this fall that the University of
Rochester's Business School rescind its acceptance of a Japanese
employee of Fuji Film.
Moreover, we have watched as 199 congressmen from nearly 20
standing House and Senate Committees have started to confer on a
new omnibus trade bill, a bill that some observers now, fear will be-
come the Smoot-Hawley Act of nontariff barriers.2 If you have not
yet seen it, that legislative package is so thick that it is currently be-
ing held together with rubber bands rather than staples. At the
same time, we have witnessed labor unrest in South Korea, one of
our most controversial trading partners, the passage by the House
of Representatives of a textile bill that may become the subject of a
presidential veto, and the appointment of a new Secretary of Com-
merce, Mr. C. William Verity, Jr.
This past week, we watched as Canadian negotiators walked out of
historic talks to conclude a United States-Canada Free Trade Agree-
ment, a pact designed to liberalize some 7% of the world's trade, in
the face of an October 4th deadline that Congress had set for sub-
mission of a final draft. 3 We have witnessed the formal launching
last fall of the eighth round of multilateral trade negotiations under
1. By year's end, the dollar had fallen even further, to 123.7 yen. See Nash, Plunge in
Dollar Brings Call by U.S. for Stabilization, N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1987, at Al, col. 6.
2. The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-361, 46 Stat. 590, which set
the most protectionist tariff levels in United States history, is widely viewed as having
substantially contributed to the Great Depression. See R. Pastor, Congress and the Poli-
tics of U.S. Foreign Economic Policy 78-79 (1980).
3. After considerable suspense, the two nations finally signed the Free Trade Agree-
ment on January 2, 1988. At this writing, both the accord and its implementing legisla-
tion are awaiting congressional approval. For a discussion of the U.S., Canadian, and
international legal issues raised by the free-trade negotiations, see Koh, The Legal Mar-
kets of International Trade: A Perspective on the Proposed United States-Canada Free
Trade Agreement, 12 YaleJ. Int'l L. 193 (1987).
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the auspices of the General Agreements of Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), 4 the so-called Uruguay Round. 5 If that round is not the
last GAT round ever, it will almost certainly be the last one in this
century, and by even the most conservative estimates, will extend
well into the next Presidency.
Last, but by no means least, we have watched as American trade
policy has become a central issue in the upcoming 1988 presidential
and congressional elections. "Competitiveness" has become the
rallying cry for declared and undeclared candidates on every side of
the political aisle. And with the political demise of Gary Hart 6 and
Joseph Biden, we have watched Congressman Richard Gephardt of
Missouri take the lead in the Democratic polls in Iowa, running al-
most entirely on an international trade platform. That platform
consists in large measure of Congressman Gephardt's controversial
proposed amendment to the omnibus trade bill. The Gephardt
Amendment 7 would require the President of the United States to
retaliate against countries such as Japan, Taiwan, and Korea, which
are running "excessive and unwarranted" trade surpluses with the
United States, with the goal of forcing those countries to reduce
their surpluses by 10% annually. Thus, the Gephardt Amendment
is nothing more or less than an international trade variant of the
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings8 budget-balancing bill, which likewise
takes an automatic, phased, numerical approach to deficit reduction.
Each of our panelists today have been deeply involved in some or
all of these recent events. The Review has, therefore, designed our
four panels so that the panelists can apply their unique perspectives
to help us unravel these extraordinarily important and complex
events. To add an academic perspective to the more pragmatic ones
that our panelists will offer, let me suggest four dichotomies-or if
you prefer, four sets of tensions-that run through all four panels.
These four dichotomies, which permeate the entire field of Ameri-
4. See Glossary at 129.
5. See Glossary at 130.
6. Subsequently, of course, Senator Hart re-entered, then again withdrew, from the
presidential race.
7. Trade and International Economic Policy Reform Act of 1987, H.R. 3, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 126, 133 Cong. Rec. 2,755-57 (1987). Subsequently, Congressman
Gephardt also withdrew from the presidential race, and his amendment will likely be
dropped in conference. Yet, it seems paradoxical that Congressman Gephardt should
have been so anxious to reduce the President's discretion over international trade at the
same time that he was personally so anxious to become President; if he had been truly
serious about the Gephardt Amendment, then he probably was not really serious about
being President, and vice versa.
8. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177,
1985 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News (99 Stat.) 1038.
Special Issue 1:4, 1988
Trade Dichotomies
can trade law and policy, I will call the interplay between: law and
policy, substance and process, institutions and ideology, and illusion
and reality. Let me briefly explain what I mean by each.
I. Law and Policy
Given the name of our institutional sponsor, it seems only proper
that this conference should first explore the dichotomy between law
and policy in the trade area. To be sure, this conference is entitled
"American Trade Policy: Actors, Issues and Options." But the cen-
tral focus of each of today's panels will be on law-the role that law
and lawyers can play and are playing in facilitating or hindering the
development of a sensible American trade policy.
The Yale Law & Policy Review takes as its motto the statement made
by Professors Harold Lasswell and Myres McDougal more than 40
years ago that the study of law should be the study of "public policy
in the public interest." 9 The principal question we address today is
whether United States trade law-as it exists and is developing at
this critical moment in our trade relations-in fact furthers or hin-
ders the development of public policy in the public interest. As our
first panel, "Administrative Agencies, Private Parties, and the
Courts" will discuss, to a degree unmatched by other nations, the
United States has adopted a legalistic,judicialized approach to regu-
lating imports. That approach allows private American industries to
allege before administrative agencies and courts that foreign indus-
tries have violated certain formulae that have been detailed in stat-
utes, and that consequently, executive branch officials are required
to impose retaliatory measures on foreign imports.
The proponents of this legalistic, rule-based system argue that
our "litigious" approach to trade law gives private parties their day
in court, allows all interested parties to receive the maximum
amount of information, and ensures predictable and neutral deci-
sionmaking in accordance with legislatively prescribed rules.' 0 The
approach's critics have responded that this system gives self-inter-
ested private parties inordinate access to the decisionmaking pro-
cess, unnecessarily restrains the discretion of executive officials in
sensitive foreign policy matters, and lends itself to abuse by power-
9. See Lasswell and McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional
Training in the Public Interest, 52 Yale L.J. 203 (1943).
10. See, e.g., Jackson, Perspectives on the Jurisprudence of International Trade:
Costs and Benefits of Legal Procedures in the United States, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 1570
(1984).
Yale Law & Policy Review
ful special interests who can win waivers of the rules in big cases or
who, through lobbying, can influence how Congress writes the stat-
utory criteria. Moreover, these critics suggest, this approach em-
beds in United States law statutory formulae that make no sense
from a long-range economic and policy perspective. The result,
some trade practitioners have argued, is that in the United States,
"trade law is not merely an important aspect of . . . trade policy,
[trade law] actually is trade policy.""
Under this legalistic approach, trade policymaking officials spend
inordinate amounts of time appeasing those industries that have in-
voked the statutory process successfully-even relatively unimpor-
tant industries like the cut flower, golf cart, or shingles and shakes
industries 12 -with the result that our trade policy is conducted inef-
ficiently, incoherently, and without any clear sense of what our na-
tional trade priorities are. For example, the President may veto a
textile bill on one day, and then be forced to give the textile indus-
tries quotas to end a countervailing duty case on the next.
Thus, the first key question to be asked at this conference is
whether there is too much or too little law in United States trade
policy. Should trade policy at both the domestic and international
level be made with greater or lesser reference to legal rules? In
seeking answers to these questions, I am delighted that our confer-
ence participants include scholars, judges, and public and private
sector practitioners, and that we have representatives here from the
legislative and executive branches, as well as from the administrative
agencies. The fact that so many of these participants have worn not
one, but several, of these hats during their careers only enhances
their ability to provide thoughtful and balanced consideration of
this first relationship, between trade law and trade policy.
II. Substance and Process
The second dichotomy that dominates this conference is the rela-
tionship and tension between substance and process. Two of our
panels, the first and the third, concern the process of creating and
11. See Howell & Wolff, The Role of Trade Law in the Making of Trade Policy, in J.
Jackson, R. Cunningham & C. Fontheim, International Trade Policy: The Lawyer's Per-
spective 3-1, 3-21 (1985) (emphasis in original).
12. In May 1986, for example, a petition filed by the United States shingles and
shakes industry forced President Reagan to impose tariffs on certain Canadian products,
thereby jeopardizing the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement talks. Yet cedar
shingles and shakes currently comprise less than one-seventh of one percent of the total
volume of United States-Canada trade. See Koh, supra note 3, at 215-16 n.79.
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implementing trade policy: Who decides what our trade policy
should be? The second and fourth panels concern the substance of
United States trade policy: What exactly should that policy be?
Obviously, a close interplay exists between process and substance
in the trade field. On the one hand, the question of who decides our
trade policy necessarily determines that policy's substance; on the
other, the various actors' substantive policy biases inevitably drive
them to structure the decisionmaking process in a way that gives
some institutions and not others final decisionmaking authority.
I have already suggested some of the questions that face our first
"process" panel, "Administrative Agencies, Private Parties, and the
Courts." Let me point out that our third panel, on the roles of the
President and Congress, will remind us that these procedural ques-
tions have not just statutory, but also constitutional, stature. In this
bicentennial year of our Constitution, the Iran-Contra affair, the Per-
sian Gulf controversy, the debate over the reinterpretation of the
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and the Supreme Court's decisions
striking down the legislative veto' 3 and provisions of the Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings Act14 have all reawakened our national conscious-
ness regarding how separation-of-powers principles function in the
foreign affairs realm. The confirmation hearings of Judge Robert
Bork and the debate over his views about the scope of executive
power have invited us to reconsider what role the courts should play
in mediating this ongoing tug-of-war between the two political
branches.
But all of the legal and policy issues that arise out of these recent
events-regarding the appropriate degree of congressional over-
sight and participation in foreign affairs, the acceptable restraints on
presidential discretion to deal with international problems, the
search for constitutional substitutes for the legislative veto, and the
constitutionally permissible role of the independent administrative
agencies-have been the subject of debate for years in the trade
area. So I would both hope and expect the members of our third
panel-all of whom are experts on current separation-of-powers is-
sues in the trade area -to instruct us on what is happening in that
field. I also hope they will suggest some broader lessons about ap-
propriate degrees of presidential discretion and congressional over-
sight that we can carry and apply to other realms of foreign policy,
13. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
14. Bowsher v. Synar, 106 U.S. 3181 (1986).
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for example, covert operations, foreign intelligence, and war-
making.
Our second and fourth panels concern the substance of U.S. trade
policy. Obviously, reducing a record trade deficit calls for two types
of action: reducing imports and boosting exports. Achieving the first
task-controlling and reducing imports-is the announced goal of
the new omnibus trade bill and other legislative efforts on Capitol
Hill. The second task, boosting exports, calls for two solutions: a
demand-side solution-opening closed foreign markets so that
United States exporters may gain greater access to foreign consum-
ers-and a supply-side solution-improving the competitiveness of
United States industries. Our second panel, "Controlling Imports
and Opening Foreign Markets," will address both the import prob-
lem and the demand-side aspect of the export problem. Its primary
focus will be on the wisdom or foolishness of various provisions in
the proposed omnibus trade legislation. Our fourth and last panel,
"Competitiveness of U.S. Industries," will address the supply-side
aspect of the export problem, by considering the structural dimen-
sions of our international competitiveness problem.
Our two substantive panels will offer predictions regarding both
the kind of omnibus trade act that is possible and the specific provi-
sions that will likely emerge from the House and Senate conference.
But I hope that our panelists will not shy away from the broader
question of what kinds of legislative solutions will actually work. Do
the various legislative remedies being proposed really target the un-
derlying structural causes of our trade deficit? Do our various import
solutions comport with or undercut our export strategy? And just
what is the fine line between legislative innovation and legislative
gimmick, and on what side of that line do measures like the
Gephardt Amendment fall?
III. Institutions and Ideology
A third and even more general dichotomy around which this con-
ference will revolve is what I call the tension between institutions
and ideology. To me, the most striking development in the interna-
tional trade system during the Reagan era has been the growing
cynicism, at both the domestic and international level, about the
post-World War II vision of multilateral trade management. By
multilateral trade management, I mean the once widely accepted
view that the most sensible way for nations to avoid international
economic warfare is through the administration of international
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trade by neutral, nonpolitical institutions applying mutually agreed-
upon legal rules to trade problems. At the international level, the
postwar system rested on the notion that multilateral trade manage-
ment was best accomplished through the GATT, with that institu-
tion applying universally accepted norms about nondiscrimination.
At the domestic level, the postwar trade system within the United
States similarly rested on an assumption that the United States
could most effectively lead this international system with prudent
presidential leadership designed to promote a substantive norm of
free trade, guided only by limited congressional oversight and some
expert advice from neutral agencies, such as the International Trade
Commission (ITC). 15
We can debate whether or not these ideal visions ever reached
fruition, even in the immediate postwar era. But what does seem
clear is that, at least in theory, these postwar domestic and interna-
tional decisionmaking structures fit together neatly. Under presi-
dential leadership designed to promote a norm of free trade, the
United States could lead a multilateral international system founded
on substantive principles of nondiscrimination, thereby rendering
the entire international trade system internally coherent.
Today, however, this institutional model is under attack at both
levels by an ideological model of power politics. At the interna-
tional level, we find growing skepticism about the efficacy of multi-
lateralism as the procedural solution to international problems-with
suspicion directed not just at the GATF, but also at tottering polit-
ical institutions, such as the United Nations, UNESCO, and the In-
ternational Court of Justice. Moreover, we encounter growing
doubt among our trading partners about the wisdom of basing a
world trading regime upon substantive principles of nondiscrimina-
tion and unconditional most-favored-nation status. And so we see
new procedural innovations: the proliferation of bilateral free trade
agreements, side deals outside the GATT framework, plurilateral
monetary management by the Group of 7 nations, and unilateral re-
taliatory trade actions of the type that the United States has recently
authorized against many of its trading partners, including not just
the newly industrialized nations, Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, but
also its major political allies, Japan and the European Community.
At the domestic level, Congress' protectionist bias has made it reluc-
tant even to pay lip service to substantive notions of free trade.
Moreover, the Iran-Contra affair and President Reagan's lame-duck
15. See Glossary at 129.
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status have resulted in unprecedented congressional domination of
the trade process. Consequently, we are seeing domestic and inter-
national trade policies that are less guided by institutions and rules
than they are driven by ideological concerns and power politics.
Even more troubling, we are witnessing a growing disjunction be-
tween our evolving domestic and international decisionmaking
structures. At a time when arguably we need greater bipartisan con-
sensus on new national policies to deal with new international trade
arrangements, we are witnessing greater political conflict and con-
frontation between the President and Congress over who should
control the way in which we deal with these problems. I hope that
today's discussions will not overlook this third tension-between
the decline of institutions and the rise of ideology in the manage-
ment of international trade-and the impact that those trends will
have on the future of our trade policy.
IV Illusion and Reality
Fourth and perhaps most crucially, I hope this conference will ad-
dress the relationship between illusion and reality in the trade area.
One cannot long study the statements and actions of all actors in the
trade field-the Executive, the Congress, the courts, the agencies,
and private industry-without starting to suspect that much of what
we see and read about American trade policy is one gigantic illusion,
orchestrated with blue smoke and mirrors.
And in the trade process, no one seems wholly free from blame.
Recently, for example, the President announced his firm commit-
ment to the GATT and multilateralism at the same time as he
launched a whole new wave of unilateral trade retaliations. The
Democratic presidential candidates announce that the competitive-
ness problem lies within our boundaries, but some of them have
nevertheless gone on to campaign in Iowa and New Hampshire
against the Japanese and the Europeans. Some of the same con-
gressmen who bash Toshiba radios, the New York Times tells us, drive
home at night in Toyotas and Mercedes.' 6 We argue that other na-
tions' trade surpluses result from "unfair" trade practices simply be-
cause those practices differ from our own, but then we engage in
many of those same practices ourselves. We recognize that world
welfare will be improved by trade expansion, but then we debate
and pass trade-restricting legislation. We recognize as a nation that
16. See Dowd, Speaking of Imports, What's That Sitting in Your Parking Spot?, N.Y.
Times, May 1, 1986, at A16, col. 1.
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the trade deficit calls for a fundamental reallocation of private and
public resources into such areas as worker education, trade adjust-
ment assistance, and industrial policies, but then we pursue only
those legislative options that avoid reallocating those resources.
In many senses, this final tension between illusion and reality is
the one that most dominates our national debate over trade policy.
But none of our panelists today have gotten to where they are by
being shy. More than a few of them have made names for them-
selves by pointing out when an emperor has no clothes. As the day
progresses, I hope that none of them will hesitate to shout out if
they should spot a naked emperor walking by. So without further
ado, let me call up our first group of panelists, so that we may begin
to explore these four dichotomies in American trade policy.
